The presence of publicly traded debt in firm's capital structure leads to coordination and restructuring problems as the firm nears financial distress and investment is distorted. Based on this perspective, I describe the market for debt repurchases as a substitute for renegotiation and examine whether deleveraging through repurchases improves investment efficiency. Using a sample of debt repurchases initiated by U.S. firms from 1996 to 2011, I find that firms are more likely to repurchase outstanding debt either by open market transactions or tender offers when investment frictions are relatively high. This improvement is more pronounced for firms with higher expected transfers to bondholders. To address the endogeneity of the repurchase choice, I examine an exogenous shock to the incentives to repurchase debt provided by a provision of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and find similar improvements in investment efficiency.
I. Introduction
Why and when do firms repurchase publicly traded debt? Although debt retirement by open market repurchases and tender offers are rather common, very little is understood about the market for debt repurchases and the motives behind these financing activities. This is surprising, given the large amount of money involved in these transactions. In 2010, for example, total cash repurchases of publicly traded debt by U.S. firms reached an all-time high of $88 Billion 1 . Debt repurchases tend to be quite large, averaging $151.4 million per transaction. The repurchase retires 53% of the face value of the targeted bond on average, and reduces the repurchasing firm's leverage ratio by more than 16%. It is not obvious why a firm would choose to make non-required payments to bondholders rather than invest or pay the cash directly to the shareholders in the form of dividends or share repurchases. It is even more puzzling considering that most firms repurchase debt after periods of low cash flow. If a manager is acting in the interest of the shareholders, there must be some value to repurchasing debt from the perspective of the owners of the firm. This paper examines an investment based explanation as one potential motive for why firms choose to repurchase outstanding public debt. Using a sample of open market debt repurchases and tender offers by US firms over the period 1996 to 2011, I find empirical evidence that firms repurchase debt to ease debt-induced investment frictions.
When a firm adds risky debt to its capital structure, it introduces a series of financial obligations, legal constraints, and incentives that can cause conflicts between managers, shareholders and debt holders. Myers (1977) showed that when a firm has risky debt in its capital structure, managers acting in the interest of shareholders may reject positive net present value investment opportunities. This underinvestment or debt overhang problem occurs when a positive net present value project decreases the value of equity because some of the value created goes to the debtholders. In other words, debt overhang increases the required rate of return to equity holders and makes it difficult for a firm to obtain external financing. Inefficiencies arising from potential transfers to bondholders represent a well-known agency cost of debt, which is especially troublesome when the outstanding debt is publicly traded and hence difficult or impossible to renegotiate outside of bankruptcy (Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) ). In contrast, bank loans are relatively easier to renegotiation prior to maturity. Sufi and Roberts (2009) show that close to 90% of all bank loans are renegotiated in some fashion prior to the maturity date of the loan. In this paper, I argue that debt repurchases serve as a market-based substitute for the renegotiation of corporate bonds. Hennessy (2004) , Hennessy, Levy and Whited (2006) and Moyen (2007) find a substantial effects of debt overhang on firm investment decisions. If a firm's existing debt structure causes deviations from its optimal investment policy, there will be gains associated with adjusting the level or composition of debt on the firm's balance sheet. When these gains outweigh the costs of adjustment, we expect to observe changes in the firm's capital structure. Building on this intuition, this paper argues that when potential transfers of investment payoffs to bondholders are high and investment is distorted, the gains to shareholders from improvements in investment efficiency and improved access to external can generate a positive net present value for a debt repurchase. Thus, in describing the market for repurchasing debt, this paper sheds light on some interesting interactions between a firm's investment, cash, and capital structure choices. I present an illustrative model in which the reduction of cash holdings in exchange for a reduction in the amount of public debt outstanding is motivated by the gains accruing to both shareholders and bondholders from reducing the investment distortion. Shareholders trade off the costs of repurchases against the benefits of improvements in investment efficiency.
In deciding whether to tender a portion of debt, bondholders trade off the reduction in payoffs in good states against the higher expected payoffs due to improved investment. I also show the conditions which simultaneously improves both shareholder and bondholder welfare and avoids the free-riding problem associated with restructuring public debt. After showing the conditions under which this use of cash to repurchase debt is profitable from the perspective of the shareholders, I empirically examine the investment decisions of firms around debt repurchases and test whether debt repurchases ease constraints on investment and equity financing. Specifically, I estimate standard investment regressions to investigate whether the quantity and quality of investment increases following the debt repurchase.
Quantity is simply measured as the level of investment expenditures, while quality is measured by examining the sensitivity of investment to growth opportunities. The intuition is that when a firm nears financial distress, investment expenditures will be less sensitive to changes in growth opportunities because some positive net present value projects will be passed over. Thus, when constraints on investment are relieved, it is expected that the investment sensitivity to growth opportunities will increase.
There are a number of econometric issues I address in the empirical tests. Clearly, firms that repurchase debt are not randomly allocated across the population of firms. The endogeneity of the repurchase choice must be addressed, since firm characteristics which lead a firm to choose to repurchase debt may also lead the firm to change its investment policy. In addition, debt and investment decisions are made simultaneously, making identification of the effect of the debt repurchase on firm performance difficult. I approach the endogeneity problem using several different methods. First, I use a two-stage least squares approach using some arguably exogenous instruments for the repurchase choice. I then look to the theory related to debt overhang to split the sample into firms that are more likely to have more significant overhang problems and test whether the changes in investment policy are larger for these subsamples of firms. Finally, I employ a matching-firm strategy based on propensity scores to create a sample of firms which have a high estimated probability of repurchasing debt but choose not to do so.
The propensity score matching essentially attempts to create a control sample such that conditional on a vector of explanatory variables, the decision to repurchase debt (the treatment) appears to be randomly distributed across the two samples, allowing for estimates of average treatment effects.
In addition to the above analysis, I employ the passing of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 as a source of exogenous variation in the likelihood of repurchasing bonds. Part of this act was intended to provide incentives for firms to restructure outstanding debt. The ARRA provides an exogenous shock to the incentives to repurchase debt through the deferral of cancellation of debt income (CODI) in section 108(i) of the tax code. When a firm purchases debt at a discount, the difference between the value of the debt at issuance and the purchase price of the debt times the amount repurchased is taxable income. The ARRA allowed firms to defer their CODI for five years and significantly reduces the effective cost of repurchasing debt. I show that the passage of the ARRA coincided with a significant increase in debt repurchase activity in the US and further use the timing of the ARRA to address the endogeneity of the repurchase decision using a difference-in-differences methodology.
My main empirical results are as follows: Firms tend to repurchase debt after periods of increasing leverage, bond rating downgrades, and following negative shocks to cash flows. Employing various proxies for potential transfers to bondholders from new investment, I show that controlling for leverage and other factors, firms are more likely to repurchase debt when investment distortions are relatively high. Investment levels and investment efficiency, as measured by sensitivity to Tobin's Q or industry investment, increases significantly following the debt repurchase. This improvement is more pronounced for firms with higher potential transfers to bondholders, lower credit ratings, higher leverage, and higher growth opportunities. This finding is robust to different proxies for growth opportunities.
Using a matching strategy based on propensity scores, I show that these results are not due to selection bias. Specifically, firms that repurchase debt have both higher investment rates (quantity) and investment efficiency (quality) following a repurchase compared to the matching sample of control firms.
Equity issuance is also found to be significantly higher for repurchasing firms relative to the control sample. Finally, I employ a difference-in-differences methodology around the suspension of the CODI tax in 2009 and find that firms that are affected by the law experience larger increases in investment compared to firms that are not affected by the law.
The literature on debt repurchases is surprisingly fairly small and young. Kruse, Nohel and Todd (2005) study the value implications of debt repurchases and conclude that they increase firm value. Yago and Li (2011) investigate the impact of the ARRA Act on debt repurchase activity. Mao and Tserlukevich (2013) model the debt repurchase decision and investigate the timing of repurchase decisions and value implications for shareholders and debtholders. Mann and Powers (2007) empirically investigate the determinants of premiums in bond tender offers. This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it represents one of the first empirical examinations of the market for repurchasing corporate debt by open market repurchase and tender offers. Second, this paper sheds some light on the relationship between debt financing and investment. Previous research has demonstrated a negative cross-sectional relationship between investment and leverage, consistent with the presence of agency costs of debt. I extend this evidence in a panel data setting to show that changes in leverage are associated with changes in investment levels and efficiency. This suggests that the market for repurchasing debt facilitates the reduction of debt-induced investment distortions when renegotiation is difficult or impossible. It also contributes to the literature on cash policy, showing that when a firm faces overhang, the value to the firm of the reduction in debt is larger than the value of holding the cash. Thus, the value of cash to shareholders relative to debt depends on the financial condition of the firm.
II. Investment and the Repurchase Decision
This section provides an illustrative model of the debt repurchase choice to clarify the intuition behind the main argument of this paper. There are three important points of the model. First, it can be demonstrated that in some cases a debt repurchase has a positive net present value for the firm. Second, while the debt repurchase may increase the value of both debt and equity, there is a potential for hold-out problems among the bondholders as collectively they want to restructure the debt but individually to not want to tender their debt claim that is expected to increase in value after the repurchase. The model demonstrates that there is a range of prices the equity holders can offer for the debt that both satisfies the incentive requirement for the equity holders and overcomes the hold-out problem. The third issue is that the firm could instead keep the cash and engage in a debt-for-equity exchange rather than repurchase the bonds. The model shows that equity holders strictly prefer a cash repurchase of debt to a debt-for-equity exchange when both options are available.
Several mechanisms for eliminating investment distortions arising from debt financing have been proposed in the literature. These approaches can be classified into three broad groups. First, firms may design debt contracts ex ante to avoid potential agency problems. Myers (1977) and Berkovitch and Kim (1990) are examples of this approach, suggesting that debt maturity, seniority and inclusion of specific covenants can minimize the agency costs of debt before the debt is in place. Empirical evidence related to the design of debt contracts is mostly consistent with the predictions of these models.
For example, Guedes and Opler (1996) document that firms with more growth opportunities tend to issue debt with shorter maturity. Second, firms may attempt to renegotiate the terms of debt in order to resolve conflicts between security holders after the debt is in place and allow for more efficient investment choices (see Hart and Moore (1989) ). Chatterjee, Dhillon and Ramiriz (1996) and Gilson, John and Lang (1990) examine debt renegotiation empirically, documenting the factors that contribute to successful renegotiation. Renegotiation usually takes the form of a reduction in principal or interest, extension of debt maturity, changes in covenants, or debt-for-equity exchanges.
These two methods for alleviating overhang may not completely eliminate the underinvestment problem in all states of the world. In the first case, while the design of debt contracts ex ante can be effective, incomplete contracting problems make this preventive action less than sure. Since it is impossible to ensure that managers will always accept positive NPV projects as they arise, optimal debt design at the time of issuance is insufficient. In the second case, debt renegotiation can be difficult when there is more than one debt holder or when the debt is publicly traded. With public debt outstanding, a firm faces coordination and free-riding problems that make renegotiation difficult or impossible. In addition, even in the absence of free-rider problems, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 requires unanimous consent of debt holders to change the major features of publicly traded debt contracts.
A third proposed remedy is to devise ways to eliminate existing debt or change the structure of existing debt to minimize the distortions prior to the investment decision. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) show the conditions under which it is profitable for a firm to exchange its outstanding public debt with equity or more senior debt securities. The value from exchanging securities is derived from the firm nearing an optimal investment policy and increasing the ability to obtain external financing when needed for investment. This paper falls into this third category, arguing specifically that in the case when debt is publicly traded, market-based bond repurchases substitute for renegotiation in reducing investment distortions.
This section presents a model which demonstrates that when a firm is facing an investment distortion (i.e. potential transfers to bondholders are high), cash repurchases of outstanding debt have a positive net present value. The gains to the firm arise from improvements in investment efficiency and improved access to external financing. The costs of reducing cash balances are reduced by the fact that in the case of default, bondholders have priority on the firm's assets, including cash. When the default probability is high, the value of the cash to shareholders is low since it is likely to be transferred to bondholders. Thus, in the case of debt overhang, the value of a reduction in debt increases, while at the same time the value of cash decreases, causing cash balances to no longer be equal to negative debt.
The use of cash also plays a role in mitigating potential freerider problems among the bondholders.
There is an analogy between a firm's choice to repurchase corporate debt and the choice of a nation to repurchase outstanding sovereign debt. The ability of debt repurchases to mitigate overhang problems has long been debated in the international economics literature. While open market debt repurchases have been suggested as a way countries can mitigate debt overhang, Bulow and Rogoff (1991) argue that cash repurchases of outstanding debt may just be a giveaway to creditors. Since a country's productive resources and cash reserves do not serve directly as collateral, the creditors' collateral derives from their ability to threaten the country with reductions in trade credits and other measures. Since debt repayments are not tied directly to the country's assets, the use of cash to repurchase debt may not be in the indebted country's interest. However, in the case of a corporation, debtors have a legal claim to the firm's productive assets, including cash, in the case of default. Thus, the debt repurchase motive should be stronger for firms since the value of the cash to shareholders should be decreasing as default probabilities increase. I do not model incentive effects related to managerial effort as Krugman (1986) does in the case of sovereign debt repurchases, although it is certainly reasonable that managerial effort may be affected by the size of the debt burden. The main predictions of the model arise from maximizing payoffs across various financial decisions. Adding managerial incentives would not change the main implications of the model, but would increase the benefits of debt repurchases to both shareholders and bondholders.
For example, the incentive effect could be incorporated by letting the probability of the good outcome be a function of managerial effort. Since this would change the magnitude but not the direction of the predicted outcomes, I do not add the additional complexity to the model. It turns out that modeling managerial effort is not necessary as it may be in the case of sovereign debt repurchases. Since the firm's cash balances can be transferred to bondholders in the case of default, the value of cash to the shareholders can drop sufficiently to induce a debt repurchase.
A. Setup and Timeline
The model has three types of participants: shareholders, public bondholders and a manager. To simplify matters and to focus on the conflict between shareholders and bondholders, the model assumes that the manager of the firm maximizes shareholder value and that her interests are perfectly aligned with the shareholders. All agents are risk-neutral, and the risk-free rate of interest is set at zero. For simplicity and exposition, assume that there are N bondholders, each holding an equal fraction 1 N of the outstanding public debt 2 . Furthermore, it is assumed that all agents have access to the same information about cash flows and investment opportunities.
The model has two periods, illustrated in Figure 1 . In some previous period before (t = 1), the debt contract was negotiated and issued by the firm with a total face value of D, which matures at t = 1. The debt is serviced by the assets acquired by the firm with the proceeds of the debt issue. The asset is expected to generate cash flows of CF AIP (cash flows from assets-in-place) at t = 1 such that E(CF AIP ) ≥ D. Thus, the bonds are issued at par and the market price is V D = 1 for each dollar of face value. The firm also holds liquid assets (cash and marketable securities) in the amount C. At this point, the firm is indifferent between holding cash and repurchasing debt; or, in other words, cash is equal to negative debt in the initial period.
At t = 0, the firm receives information about an adverse shock to cash flows from assets in place.
The shock is such that the total expected assets of the firm will not be sufficient to pay off the debt at
The firm also has an option to invest in an investment opportunity at a cost of I. The payoff from the investment project depends on the state of the world at t = 1. There are two possible states, {H, L}. The good state occurs with probability p H , in which case the project pays cash flows of X H . In the bad state, the project pays off an amount X L . Further, it is assumed that if the firm invests and the good state occurs, then the firm has enough cash to pay off the entire amount of debt. In the bad state, which occurs with probability 1 − p H , there is a deficit and the bondholders are assumed to take control of the assets. The project has a positive net present value:
Intuitively, the firm finds itself in financial distress because of the old debt but is not in economic distress as the firm has a good investment opportunity and hence its continuation value exceeds its liquidation value.
B. Investment and Repurchase Decision
At t = 0, the manager decides on an investment and debt policy. In particular, the manager must decide whether or not to invest and whether or not to repurchase a portion of outstanding debt (assuming for the moment that repurchases are not restricted by covenant). At t = 1, the uncertainty related to the payoff to new investment is resolved and the firm is liquidated. Strict priority of claims is assumed, so bondholders take over the firm's fixed assets and cash holdings if the debt is not paid in full.
Suppose C < I, so that the firm does not have enough cash to fully finance the investment and must raise new external financing. Will the firm obtain financing and invest? The optimal investment rule that maximizes the value of the firm is to accept any investment with a positive net present value. However, with risky debt outstanding, the shareholders will only realize a portion of the gains from investment.
Given the assumptions of the model, the payoff to shareholders is max[0,
The shareholders receive nothing in the bad state and receive CF AIP +C + X H − D − I in the good state.
Thus, the manager will accept the investment project only if
otherwise, the project will be rejected.
This is the classic debt overhang problem of Myers (1977) . Debt overhang essentially increases the threshold value for accepting investment projects. The net present value from the shareholders' perspective is less than the net present value to the firm because a portion of the returns from investment are transferred to bondholders. If the potential transfer is too high, the firm will not be able to obtain financing and invest in the project.
Suppose the parameters of the model are such that the investment rule in equation (1) leads to rejection of the project, i.e., the firm's investment decision is distorted by the existing debt. If the firm cannot change the amount of debt outstanding, the shareholders will not invest and will receive a payoff of zero in the terminal period, while bondholders will receive a total of E(B 0 ) = E[CF AIP ] +C, where B 0 denotes total payments to bondholders if the investment project is not accepted. The market price of the bonds would then be
D per dollar of face value. Since the debt is publicly traded, efficient renegotiation is ruled out. Unless prohibited by bondholders at issuance, the manager still retains the option to use the firm's cash to repurchase debt. The following proposition states the conditions under which it is profitable for the firm to repurchase a portion of outstanding debt:
, then the firm will repurchase debt with cash and invest in the project. In this case, the value to the shareholders from the reduction in debt is larger than the value of the foregone cash. That is, the debt repurchase has a positive NPV for equity.
Proof. See appendix.
Here, V D represents the maximum price per dollar of face value that shareholders are willing to pay bondholders. Since V D < 1, a repurchase of debt at a discount relative to face value reduces the face value of debt by an amount larger than the amount of cash used in the repurchase. In addition, the higher probability of default resulting from the shock to cash flows reduces the value to the shareholders of holding cash. Another way to think of it is by viewing the value of equity as a call option on the value of assets with a strike price of D, this means that the strike price is reduced by an amount
which is larger than C. If the bond price is attractive enough, the "strike price", or face value of debt, is reduced enough to induce the shareholders to invest. The expected gain to the shareholders from the
, outweighs the expected value of retaining the cash to shareholders, p H C, if they do not repurchase debt. Note that the shareholders will still receive nothing in the case of the bad state.
However, the repurchase increases the payoff to shareholders if the good state is realized. In order to be profitable for the firm to repurchase debt, the reduction in face value must be large enough to pay off the remaining debt in the good state, while still providing a sufficient return to the new equity.
Proposition 1 states that the benefit to shareholders of a repurchase (manifested by willingness to pay) is decreasing in the level of debt and increasing in the project's cash flows in the good state. The willingness to pay is also increasing the in probability of realizing the good state. Thus, it is not only the level of debt that matters. The crucial determinant of the value of a repurchase to shareholders is the size of the potential transfer to bondholders. When these potential transfers are large, the value of a reduction in debt is more valuable than holding cash. The benefits of the efficiency gains outweigh the cost of repurchase to shareholders. If, however, potential transfers are zero, then cash is the same as negative debt. In the presence of overhang, the benefits to the shareholders from a repurchase outweigh the costs. The empirical prediction here is that firms are more likely to repurchase debt when these potential transfers are high. In addition, the observed investment and financing behavior of the firm should change following the debt repurchase. Specifically, the level of investment should increase, as should the responsiveness of investment to growth opportunities as they arise.
C. The Free-Rider Problem and Bondholder Welfare
Proposition 1 gave the conditions under which the shareholders become better off by repurchasing debt and investing at t = 0, assuming that the bondholders would be willing to sell a portion of their debt.
However, part of the gain to shareholders comes from a lower level of debt to pay off at period t = 1.
A reduction in the amount of debt outstanding implies that the payoffs to bondholders in the good state are reduced. If bondholders are hurt by a debt repurchase, they could potentially refuse to tender a portion of their outstanding claim or just include a covenant at issuance prohibiting the shareholders from buying back the debt prior to maturity.
It turns out that bondholders as a group are better off if the firm repurchases a portion of outstanding debt. The reason is that the shareholders will not accept the profitable investment project without repurchasing debt. Since contracts are incomplete, the bondholders are not able to commit the firm to accept all positive net present value projects. The highest possible payoff to the bondholders results when the firm invests but does not repurchase debt. Repurchasing debt reduces the total payoff to bondholders in the good state. However, allowing the shareholders to repurchase debt prior to maturity maximizes bondholder wealth across feasible strategies. The payoff to bondholders is lowest if the firm does not invest. Bondholders find themselves in somewhat of a prisoner's dilemma. If they prohibit repurchases, the owners of the firm will not invest in the project and the value of debt will fall to its minimum value. Thus, it is in the interest of the bondholders as a group to allow repurchases and thus induce more efficient investment policies.
Although bondholders as a group are better off if the firm repurchases a portion of outstanding debt, each individual bondholder has an incentive to hold out since the value of their remaining bonds increases following the repurchase. If the incentives to hold out are strong enough, none of the bondholders will be willing to tender a portion of their claim. Suppose an individual bondholder is considering whether to sell a proportion β ≤ 1 of their outstanding claim. The following proposition states the conditions under which the bondholder will sell part of their bond holdings: Proof. See appendix.
If the repurchase price is at least as large as expected post-repurchase per dollar value of the remaining portion of outstanding debt, then each individual bondholder will be willing to tender at that price. In essence, the shareholders are paying a premium over the current market price to compensate bondholders for lowering their payoff in the good state. Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that if the repurchase price satisfies V D ≤ V D ≤ V D , the firm will offer to repurchase debt, the bondholders will be willing to sell, and the firm will invest. The price at which the transaction actually takes place determines the allocation of the surplus efficiency gain between the shareholders and bondholders.
They key to overcoming the free-rider problem is the use of cash. Cash held on the balance sheet serves as collateral for the bondholders. In the case of default, the bondholders receive the remaining cash balance. Prior to default, equity has control over the use of cash. When the shareholders offer to repurchase debt with cash, they are offering to transfer part of the collateral to all bondholders to those who are willing to tender. As a consequence, the collateral value for the hold-outs is lower as the cash holdings have dropped. The shifting of collateral through a bond repurchase to willing bondholders reduces the incentive to free ride.
D. Exchange or Repurchase?
Up to this point I have shown that there is a range of repurchase prices that both encourage shareholders to invest and overcomes the free-rider problem among the bondholders. The order of events is that firms repurchase debt, issue new equity, and invest. Rather than using cash to repurchase debt, the firm could offer an exchange of debt for equity to reduce the debt burden sufficiently to mitigate the debt overhang problem. Debt-for-equity exchanges are common among financially distressed firms and have been shown to decrease the probability of bankruptcy. For example, Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) find that 59% of their sample of debt-restructuring firms attempted an exchange offer. The firms that successfully completed an exchange were less likely to subsequently file for Chapter 11 protection relative to other types of restructurings. In an exchange, the shareholders would keep the cash and reduce the debt burden at the cost of diluting their equity claim. A natural question is why the firm doesn't just engage in an exchange offer of debt for equity, as the mechanics of the exchange look very similar to that of the repurchase. The following proposition establishes the relative preference between repurchases and exchanges:
Proposition 3. If a firm has an amount of cash C available to repurchase a sufficient portion of debt
to induce investment, the shareholders will strictly prefer a debt repurchase over a debt-for-equity exchange.
It can be shown that there exists an equity-for-debt exchange ratio such that the shareholders' and bondholders' expected payoffs are the same as under the repurchase case. However, the preference for repurchases arises because the hold-out problem is more severe in the debt-for-equity exchange. If the firm does not repurchase debt, the cash remains on the balance sheet as collateral and is transferred to the bondholders in the case of default, whereas in the repurchase case the cash is no longer available to be recovered by bondholders in the bad state. This means that any feasible offer price from the shareholders will be lower than the per dollar value of non-exchanged debt. Hence, no individual bondholder will be willing to exchange a portion of their debt for equity and the free-rider problem remains.
III. Data
The overall sample of firms is taken from the combined annual research, full coverage, and industrial
Compustat files for the years 1992 to 2012. Utilities (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded from the analysis. Observations with missing data for the relevant items (total assets, long term debt, cash, etc.) are deleted. Monthly stock returns are taken from the CRSP monthly stock price file. To be included in the sample, the firm must have a non-zero amount of long-term debt outstanding. The appendix contains a list of data definitions used in the following empirical tests.
A. Debt Repurchases
The debt repurchase data are obtained from several sources. The 2012 version of the Mergent 3 Fixed
Income Securities Database (FISD) provides one source of repurchase information. This database contains detailed information related to corporate debt issued between 1980 to 2011. In addition to the characteristics of the debt at issuance, the data contain a detailed history of changes in the amount outstanding for debt issues in the database. Reductions in the amount outstanding can be due to calls, conversion to equity, refunding, defeasance, maturity, IPO clawbacks, repurchases by open market programs or tender offers, sinking funds, optional increases in sinking funds, or exchanges. The database contains the effective date of the change in amount outstanding, as well as the reduction amount and the remaining principal balance after the reduction in debt. Other debt repurchases were obtained by searching through financial reports, press releases, the Bloomberg Corporate Events Calendar, and discussions with practitioners 4 . The debt repurchase data cover the 1996-2011 period. In order to focus on cash repurchases of debt, I eliminate debt repurchases that appear to be part of a debt exchange or refunding program (if debt is issued around the same time of the repurchase). Excluding debt repur-chases by financial firms and utilities, the repurchase sample is composed of 3,790 debt repurchases, of which 1,594 are open market repurchases and 2,196 are tender offers. Table I summarizes the debt repurchase data. Panel A shows that total debt repurchase activity has been steadily increasing over time. The total amount of debt repurchase activity among the sample firms was$11.7 billion in 1996 and $65.3 billion in 2011. Of this total, $6.9 billion was repurchased through open market transactions, while $58.3 billion was repurchased through tender offers. Repurchase activity as a proportion of total debt issuance by US industrial firms increased from 5.5% of issuance in 1996 to 9.5% of total issuance in 2011. Unlike total debt issuance, which appears to be cyclical over the sample period, debt repurchase activity has been increasing at a relatively steady pace.
Repurchase activity increased significantly in 2009 and 2010. for tender offers. The maturity characteristics of repurchased debt are similar across both repurchase methods. The average initial maturity for repurchased debt is 10.84 years, while the remaining maturity after the repurchase is 6.90 years.
Panel C compares the seniority and redeemability characteristics of repurchased debt to all public bonds issued between 1996 and 2011. The vast majority (95.6%) of issued public debt is callable.
Repurchased debt is similar to the overall sample of issued bonds with respect to callability, with 95.8% of repurchased bonds featuring a call provision. Approximately 5.7% of all issued bonds are putable, about 11.6% are convertible, and about 2.2% contain sinking fund provisions. About 10.9%
of repurchased bonds are putable. Interestingly, convertible bonds make up 40% of the open market repurchase sample, compared to 6.7% for tender offers and 18% among all issued bonds. The overall sample of debt issues have a slightly higher incidence of sinking fund provisions.
B. Empirical Proxy for Expected Transfers to Bondholders
Hennessy (2004) employs a real-options approach to model the dynamic relationship between debt and investment. In his model, risky debt truncates equity's otherwise infinite horizon and drives a wedge between a firm's average and marginal Q, leading to underinvestment relative to the first-best.
Using an empirical proxy for overhang, defined as the present value of creditors' rights to recovery in default, he finds significant overhang effects on investment, particularly for firms with low credit quality. Hennessy, Levy and Whited (2005) extends the Hennessy (2004) analysis to incorporate other financial frictions and still find a significant overhang effect on investment.
The model in Section II demonstrates that leverage itself is not sufficient in describing the value to repurchasing debt. A firm with a high degree of leverage but a small probability of default will not be faced with a wedge between the overall return to investment and the return accruing to shareholders.
Likewise, a firm with low leverage but a high probability of default will be subject to possible investment distortions. The more relevant factor is the potential transfer to bondholders, or "overhang". To proxy for overhang, I construct the measure of Hennesy, Levy and Whited (2005) . The overhang correction, h, is an estimate of the expected proportion of assets claimed by bondholders in the case of default. It is calculated as
where ρ t+s is the probability of default in period t + s. I use historical default hazard rates by credit rating from Moody's to proxy for the probability of default. If the credit rating for a firm is not available, I impute it using the method of Blume, Lim and MacKinlay (1998) . For recovery ratios, I use a measure of the tangibility of assets similar to that of Berger et al. (1996) and Almeida and Campello (2005) .
Specifically, I define the recovery ratio for each firm each year as
scaled by total assets 5 . The measure assumes that the initial maturity of debt is 20 years, and assumes that the debt matures at a rate of 5% per year. Hennesy, Levy and Whited (2005) find evidence of underinvestment among firms with high overhang measures. Specifically, controlling for investment opportunities, firms with high overhang invest less.
IV. Empirical Analysis
This section examines empirically changes in investment efficiency around debt repurchases I first take a univariate approach, looking at the characteristics and credit quality of firms in event time around the debt repurchases. The second subsection tests whether the size of potential transfers to bondholders, or overhang, helps explain the choice and timing of a debt repurchase. Finally, the third subsection investigates whether debt repurchases have any impact on the real investment and financing activities of the firm.
A. Empirical Implications
When existing debt distorts investment decisions, it can be profitable for the shareholders to spend cash to repurchase a portion of outstanding debt. Thus, if the desire to mitigate investment were indeed an important factor in the decision to repurchase debt, we should expect to observe the following:
1. Firms with larger expected transfers to bondholders are more likely to repurchase debt.
Investment efficiency should increase following a debt repurchase. By investment efficiency,
it is meant that investment will become more sensitive to investment opportunities after the repurchase.
3. Firms that repurchase debt are more likely to issue equity compared to similar firms that do not repurchase debt.
4. Announcement of debt repurchases will be considered good news. Hence, announcement returns should be non-negative.
5. Given the choice between a debt repurchase and an exchange offer, the probability of a repurchase (relative to the exchange offer) is increasing in the amount of cash the firm holds. That is, exchange offers will be conducted by firms with a higher degree of financial distress.
The remaining sections in this paper will examine the investment and financing behavior of firms surrounding the debt repurchase. Other papers have found evidence largely consistent with the remaining predictions of the agency model of debt. With respect to prediction (4), several papers have documented positive stock market reactions to the announcement of tender offers. Kruse, Nohel and Todd (2005) find an average abnormal return of 1.47% around the announcement of tender offers.
Chatterjee, Dhillon and Ramirez (1995) find positive announcement effects for both stocks and bonds around the announcement of tender offers, even though the tender offers are often coercive in nature.
Julio (2009) 
B. Univariate Analysis
Conditional on having sufficient cash, firms will repurchase debt when expected transfers to bondholders are high. It is expected that firms will repurchase debt after periods of rising leverage and increasing default probabilities. Table II summarizes some selected characteristics for firms around the year of the debt repurchase. Repurchasing firms tend to be highly levered. In the years leading up to the repurchase, the mean leverage ratio increases significantly from 0.387 four years prior to the repurchase to 0.456 in the year before the debt repurchase, an increase of 17.83%. The average leverage ratio drops significantly at the year of the repurchase and settles at 0.379 three years after. On average, leverage ratios decrease by 16.9% in the period following the repurchase. For comparison, the mean leverage ratio for all firms in the Compustat sample is 0.229 over the 1996 to 2011 sample period. The average repurchasing firm is in the top quartile in terms of leverage.
While repurchasing firms tend to be highly levered in absolute terms, they are also highly levered relative to other firms in their industry. Here, the deviation from industry mean leverage is defined as the sample firm's leverage minus the mean leverage ratio of firms with the same 3-digit SIC code in the same year. The average repurchasing firm is significantly more levered than the average firm in the same industry. The deviation is 0.158 in the year prior to the repurchase. Interestingly, the average deviation from industry leverage remains significantly positive three years after the repurchase. The persistence of this deviation from the industry leverage ratio is not consistent with full target adjustment behavior, assuming the firm's industry leverage is a decent proxy for a "target" leverage ratio for the firm. It is, however, more consistent with evidence by Flannery and Rangan (2005) that actual target adjustments tend to be incomplete. Table II shows that 25% of repurchasing firms are near or below the mean leverage for their industry.
The empirical proxy for debt overhang, h, changes as expected around the repurchase. Mean overhang increases by 25% from 0.32 to 0.40 prior to the repurchase and drops to 0.025 three years after the repurchase. This drop represents a 37.5% reduction in overhang following the debt repurchase. The same pattern appears across the distribution of overhang over time. This increase in overhang is coming from two factors. First, as seen earlier, leverage increases significantly prior to the debt repurchase.
Secondly, default probabilities are increasing as well. Figure ? ? displays a very interesting pattern in average credit ratings for repurchased bonds in the months leading up to and following the repurchase.
Credit ratings are declining significantly prior to the repurchase, with an abrupt drop appearing in the two months before the repurchase takes place. Following the repurchase, credit ratings stabilize and even increase on average. On average, credit ratings drop from a Moody's Ba rating to a B rating.
This erosion of credit represents a significant change in expected default rates. Historically, the 10 year cumulative default rate on Ba rated bonds is 19.05%, compared to 31.90% for bonds with a B rating.
These two factors imply that the potential transfers to bondholders have been increasing prior to the debt repurchase for this sample of firms. Table II 
C. Determinants of the Repurchase Choice
In this section, I estimate probit regressions to examine the factors that predict whether a firm repurchases debt. This estimation is done for two reasons. First, it allows me to test whether potential transfers to bondholders add incremental explanatory power to the firm's debt repurchase decision in a multivariate setting. The idea is that firms are more likely to repurchase debt when facing debt overhang problems. Second, the predicted values obtained from the probit regressions will aid with the construction of control samples below, where I address selection and endogeneity issues.
Let y * t be the unobserved value to the firm from repurchasing debt. Define
The main interest lies in estimating marginal effects of changes in the explanatory variables. In the context of a probit model, the marginal effects are defined as holdings, and leverage. The probability of a repurchase is negatively related to Tobin's Q. The probability of repurchase is higher after firms have experienced relatively low cash flows. The marginal effect on leverage is 0.0315. This value implies that a one-standard deviation increase in leverage increases the probability of repurchasing debt by 0.0315 relative to the unconditional probability of 0.132, an increase of 24% in the predicted probability of repurchasing. The second specification shows that the probability of repurchasing debt is increasing in the distance from a firm's leverage to that of the mean industry leverage. Specification (3) includes an indicator variable for investment grade firms. Firms with investment grade bonds outstanding are 66% less likely to repurchase debt. The remaining specifications in Table III adds the debt overhang correction to the regression. The estimated marginal effect is significant and large across the remaining regressions, controlling for leverage. The marginal effect in of the overhang correction is 0.0303, suggesting a one standard deviation in overhang increases the probability of a repurchase by 23% relative to the unconditional probability, controlling for leverage.
Specification 6 includes an indicator variable that is set equal to one in the years after the passing of the ARRA Act and the associated suspension of CODI tax. Supporting the identifying assumption I will use in the investment regressions later, I find that the probability of repurchasing debt is significantly higher after the signing of the ARRA Act, consistent with the findings of Yago and Li (2011) who find that the number of repurchases tripled in the year after the ARRA was passed. Specification 7 reports evidence that there is some industry clustering in repurchase activity, as the proportion of other firms that repurchase in the same industry/year (repurchase intensity) has a large, positive marginal effect on the probability of repurchasing debt. 
D. Changes in Firm Investment
A central question in the corporate finance literature is whether the choice of financing effects the real value generating process of the firm. Investment based models of financing demonstrate that debt can have an impact on both the level and efficiency of investment, where an efficient investment policy can be defined simply as one in which all positive NPV investment projects are funded and implemented, while all negative NPV projects are rejected. The hypothesis of this paper is that investment efficiency will improve following debt repurchases as some of the potential transfers to bondholders from investment are bought back by the shareholders at a discount and firms become able to raise external financing. Empirical tests of investment efficiency are usually motivated by the Q theory of investment of Hayashi (1982) . The basic idea is that the more efficient the firm's investment policy, the more the firm's investment expenditures should covary with investment opportunities. Similar approaches have been employed in studies related to the diversification discount (Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein (2002) , internal capital markets (Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010), spinoffs (Colak and Whited (2005)) and capital overhang (Desai and Goolsbee (2005)).
Several econometric complexities arise in testing whether the reduction in leverage from debt repurchases improves the efficiency of investment by mitigating the investment friction. First, firms that repurchase debt choose to do so and hence are different from the population of all firms. This endogeneity of the repurchase decision can bias estimates of changes in efficiency. Second, investment opportunities are not directly observed, and are usually proxied by a measure of average Q (usually the market-to-book ratio). To address the endogeneity/selection problem, I attempt to identify the effect of a debt repurchase using several strategies. First, I employ firm-fixed effects to control for any timeconstant unobserved heterogeneity. Second, I use a two-stage least squares approach using industry and regulatory variables as instruments for the choice to repurchase debt. Third, I use predictions of the agency-cost model to split up the sample of repurchasing firms by various factors; repurchasing debt should have the largest impact on firms which have larger overhang problems. Finally, I construct a matching sample of firms based on propensity scores and estimate average treatment effects due to debt repurchases. The second issue, measurement error in Q, is less problematic in a panel data setting.
Ç olak and Whited (2005) note that investment sensitivity to Q is not contaminated by measurement error, but by variation in the measurement error variance over time. To address this, I re-estimate the results using several different proxies for firm's investment opportunities.
The baseline regression to test for changes in investment efficiency around debt repurchases has the form:
where
is the ratio of investment expenditures scaled by beginning-of-period property, plant and equipment, Q i,t−1 is the beginning-of-period market to book ratio, and Cash f low it is cash flow scaled by total assets. The β i terms capture firm fixed-effects and the γ t terms capture year effects. Here, the time index t represents the year relative to the repurchase year. The model is estimated over the years −2, −1, +1 and +2, where the dummy variable After takes a value of 1 in the period {+1, +2} and zero otherwise. The main parameters of interest are β 2 , which is interpreted as the change in investment efficiency or the quality of investment following the debt repurchase, and β 3 , which reflects changes in the level of the conditional mean of corporate investment after the repurchase. If a firm's investment policy improves following the repurchase, investment levels should increase (β 3 > 0 and investment sensitivity to investment opportunities will increase (β 2 > 0). Thus, these two parameters attempt to measure changes in both the quality and quantity of investment following a debt repurchase. Table IV In order for the instruments described above to be valid, it must be that (1) the instruments are correlated with the repurchase choice dummy, and (2) the instruments are uncorrelated with the error in equation (3) . To investigate the validity of the instruments for the repurchase choice, I regress the endogenous dummy variable on the instruments. The regressions yields an F-statistic of 53.31 for the joint hypothesis that all coefficients are zero, so requirement (1) appears to be met. I investigate requirement (2) by employing a test of overidentifying restrictions. In this setting, I have one endogenous variables in the investment regression and two instruments, leaving me with one overidentifying restriction. I first obtain the residuals from the 2SLS regression. Then, I regress the residual on all exogenous variables. This procedure yields an F-statistic of 0.23 and an R 2 of 0.0012. The test statistic turns out to be 2.69, which under the null hypothesis that at least one of the instruments is not exogenous has a chi-squared distribution with three degrees of freedom. The 5% critical value for a χ 2 3 distribution is 7.81. Therefore, the test of overidentifying restrictions does not rule out the exogeneity assumption for my choice of instruments. I also conduct a Hausman specification test to test for the endogeneity of the regressors in the investment regression. The Hausman test yields a p-value of 0.372 and hence I cannot reject the hypothesis of no endogeneity.
D.1. Subgroup Analysis
This subsection presents the regression results for different subsamples of repurchasing firms. This approach is employed to identify firms which are more likely to be repurchasing debt to remove constraints on investment. Hennessy, Levy, and Whited (2006) predict that overhang is most pronounced for firms with high leverage, high default probabilities, and high lender recoveries in default. Building on this intuition, I divide up the sample on five different pre-repurchase dimensions. First, I break up the sample into "high" and "low" overhang groups according to the median overhang correction of the repurchasing firms. I do the same for leverage. Overhang and leverage are expected to be positively correlated. In addition, Jensen (1989) notes that highly levered firms will trigger distress with smaller declines in profitability relative to low-levered firms. The third grouping is based on default probabilities; groups are divided according to whether their long-term debt ratings are investment grade or not.
Since firms with more investment opportunities are going to have higher agency costs of debt, I divide the sample by firm average Q. Finally, I estimate the investment regressions separately for open market repurchases and tender offers.
Table V displays the estimation results for the subgroups. The two overhang groups reveal an interesting pattern. Firms in the high overhang category experience a large improvement in investment efficiency, while the low overhang group shows no improvement. The pre-repurchase sensitivity of investment to Q is significantly positive for the low overhang group, but not for the high overhang group. Thus, improvements in investment efficiency appear to be concentrated among those firms for which investment was distorted prior to the debt repurchase. The results for the low overhang group suggest that mitigating overhang is not the sole reason to repurchase debt. Other reasons, such as disgorging free cash flow, may also motivate firms to repurchase debt. This same general pattern holds for the leverage and bond rating subgroups. Namely, investment is sensitive to Q prior to the repurchase for the low leverage, investment grade and short maturity structure firms, while investment sensitivity increases for those firms expected to be suffering from overhang.
Investment sensitivity to Q is significantly positive for both high and low Q firms, but improves significantly for only the high Q group. This result is consistent with the idea that highly-levered firms with higher growth prospects are more likely to suffer from overhang than low growth firms with similar leverage. The pre-repurchase sensitivity of both groups suggest that firms suffering overhang problems can be found in both high and low growth groups. 
D.2. Matching Estimators
As noted above, one problem with estimating the effect of debt repurchases on investment is that firms choose to repurchase debt rather than being assigned by random selection. This self-selection could induce a bias in the estimated changes in investment efficiency since firms choosing to repurchase debt are different from the entire population of firms. One can never observe the outcome if a firm had not repurchased debt. If repurchasing firms differ in fundamental ways, it is important to understand whether measured improvements in investment efficiency are still present after controlling for these differences. One approach for doing this is to estimate average treatment effects based on propensity score matching. In the context of this paper, the "treatment" is a debt repurchase. The idea behind treatment effects estimation is that if the assignment of the treatment is exogenous conditional on a set of control variables, then a sample of control firms can be constructed and treatment effects can be estimated by comparing averages across the two groups. This method has an advantage over traditional matching rules (eg. industry/size) because it allows for matching on a large number of pre-repurchase firm characteristics, thus reducing the bias arising from fundamental differences the treatment and control samples.
To obtain propensity scores, I obtain predicted values from the probit model estimated as specification (2) reported in Table III . I then construct a sample of control firms by matching on the probability of repurchase using a nearest-neighbor approach, sampling with replacement. The result is a control sample of firms are similar to repurchasing firms both at the time of the repurchase. I then observe differences investment levels and efficiency one year after the repurchase. Since treatment effects are based on averages and investment efficiency is based on regression slope estimates, I calculate the following statistic for each firm among both repurchasing and control firms:
This statistic is of interest because its average is the same as the slope coefficient in a simple regression of Investment on Q and has the same interpretation as before.
Control firms are selected using a nearest-neighbor algorithm based on blocks and propensity scores. Specifically, for every repurchasing firm, I select a non-repurchasing firm in the same block with the closest propensity score. Sampling of control firms is done with replacement, with the only sampling constraint being that a firm cannot be matched to itself.
Panel A of Table VI reports estimated average treatment effects and difference estimates. The relative difference estimator controls for effects of any unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics, while the level treatment effects do not. These estimates represent average changes in investment and equity issuance for treatment relative to control firms from year −1 to year +1.In the year following the repurchase, treatment firms have investment levels averaging 0.1044, compared to 0.0942 for control firms. In addition, the relative difference for investment levels is 0.0169. Repurchasing firms experience a significant increase in investment levels following the repurchase relative to otherwise similar firms. an average Q sensitivity (calculated as the average value from equation (4)) of 0.0359 compared to 0119 for control firms. Thus, the average treatment effect of a debt repurchase on Q sensitivity is 0.0240, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The difference-in-differences estimate for Q sensitivity turns out to be 0.0272. The average treatment effects and difference-in-differences estimates also show a significant increase in the sensitivity of firm investment to industry investment for repurchasing firms relative to control firms.
Panel A also reports changes in equity issuance after the debt repurchase. According to theory, firms with debt overhang problems find it difficult to raise new equity to finance profitable investment because potential shareholders view debt overhang as a large marginal tax rate on investment. Thus, if debt repurchases help mitigate this problem, we expect to see increases in equity issuance for treatment firms. Panel A supports this hypothesis. Repurchasing firms issue equity in the amount of 2.99% of total assets, compared 1.88% for control firms. The relative difference estimator is a significant 0.0272, suggesting that repurchasing firms increase equity issuance following the repurchase, while control firms tend to decrease equity-issuing activity.
Panel B reports the results the differences in estimated slope coefficients of equation (3) between treatment and control firms. For control firms, year zero is defined as the year in which the firm was selected into the control firm (the year the predicted probability of repurchasing was high). In
Panel B, we can see that when firm Average Q is used as a proxy for growth opportunities, there is no statistical difference in the pre-repurchase sensitivity to investment opportunities between the treatment and control firms. However, the change in sensitivity to Q increases significantly for treatment firms.
The coefficient on the A f ter dummy is also positive and significant, suggesting that post-repurchase investment rates are higher for firms choosing to repurchase. It is interesting to note that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is lower in the post-repurchase period for the treatment firms. The results are similar for the other two growth opportunity measures, with the exception that the difference in cash flow sensitivity is no longer significantly negative.
D.3. Decomposing Investment Expenditures
As a further robustness check, I attempt to decompose investment expenditures into two portions, one that is more sensitive to overhang, and the other portion which should not be as sensitive. Firm investment expenditures are composed of outlays on capital expenditures, acquisitions and research and development, net of sales of property, plant and equipment. Some portion of these expenditures are directed at maintenance of existing assets rather than on new investment. Problems with debt overhang arise from unaligned incentives with respect to marginal investment decisions. It is therefore likely that debt overhang will have a larger impact on expenditures related to new projects compared to maintenance expenditures.
Following Richardson (2005) , I decompose total investment expenditures into investment in new projects and investment to maintain assets in place. Investment to maintain assets in place is defined as amortization and depreciation and investment on new projects is defined as total investment net of amortization and depreciation. If a firm's depreciation schedule corresponds closely with the use of assets, then the proxy for maintenance investment should be reasonable. As Richardson (2005) notes, this probably is not the case for all firms. In addition, maintenance and amortization will not be good at capturing maintenance expenditures on intangible assets and R&D. However, to the extent that maintenance expenditures are more constant than new investment expenditures, the decomposition may be instructive. Table VII reports the results of investment sensitivity regressions for three different dependent variables, total investment, maintenance investment, and new investment. I include firm average Q, industry median Q, and asset-weighted average industry investment as proxies for investment opportunities. The regressions for total investment are reproduced from Table IV 
E. Natural Experiment: Deferral of CODI Tax
In this section, I examine the effects of debt repurchases on investment by employing a difference-indifferences (DID) methodology. The approach is well suited for attempting the disentangle causality in a quasi-experimental situation. The approach compares the effect of some event on groups affected by the event (treatment group) to those that are unaffected (control group). The inferences are made by calculating the changes in investment rates of treatment firms around the event to the changes around the event for the control firms. In this paper, we examine the effects of debt repurchases by using a legal change contained in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. The Act, signed into law on February 17, 2009, contained many provisions meant to create jobs and promote economic recovery. Part of the act was intended to provide incentives for firms to restructure outstanding debt, recognizing that debt levels were likely slowing the recovery. The ARRA provides an exogenous shock to the incentives to repurchase debt through the deferral of cancellation of debt income (CODI) in section 108(i) of the tax code. When a firm purchases debt at a discount, the difference between the value of the debt at issuance and the purchase price of the debt times the amount repurchased is taxable income. The ARRA allowed firms to defer their CODI for five years and significantly reduces the effective cost of repurchasing debt. Thus, the ARRA provided an exogenous shock to the cost of repurchasing debt.
A challenge with the DID methodology around the passing of the ARRA is that there are other factors, both observable and unobservable, that may influence investment around the law change. A second challenge is that the law was at the national level and contained many provisions, including tax relief for individuals and companies, expenditures in health care, energy and education, infrastructure development, and aid to lower income households. However, the ARRA does not affect all firms in the same manner. I use heterogeneity in the impact of the CODI tax deferral to construct treatment and control samples of firms. If the control group is chosen appropriately, it will allow me to control for common economic shocks and also to alleviate potential bias due to other changes in law around the ARRA that could have affected the treatment group.
I form two separate sets of treatment and control groups for the analysis. For the first set, I include firms with outstanding bonds at the time of the ARRA as the treatment group and firms with no bonds outstanding as the control group. Because firms with no bonds are less likely to be subject to CODI taxation in the first place and have no bonds to repurchase, they serve as a natural control group as they will be sensitive to the other provisions of the ARRA. For the second set, I take firms with a sub-investment grade rating as the treatment group and investment grade firms as the control group.
The intuition here is that, according to theory, firms with lower credit ratings have a higher potential for investment distortions and hence more to gain from repurchasing, while at the same time being 'treated' by the ARRA as their bonds are likely to be trading at a discount. Investment grade firms are unlikely to repurchase because of investment problems and their bonds are more likely to be trading near or above par, suggesting that there incentive to repurchase does not change around the CODI tax deferral.
To investigate the effect of the deferral of CODI tax, I estimate the following regression:
where α i and γt are firm and year fixed effects, 1 ARRA is a dummy variable taking a value of one in the years following the ARRA and zero otherwise, and 1 i=T is a dummy variable set equal to one for firms that belong to the treatment group and zero for firms in the control group. The coefficient η on the interaction between the two indicator variables captures the difference-in-differences effect and is the main estimate of interest in the regression.
The DID regression allows for the control of omitted variables that affect the treatment and control group similarly. However, identification of a causal effect of the CODI tax deferral on investment requires controlling for any shocks to the treatment group that may be correlated with the timing of the ARRA Act and the tax deferral. For example, the decline in investment around the passing of the ARRA may have been more significant for firms that do not have access to bond markets due to different sensitivities to the business cycle. I address this and related concerns in a variety of ways. First, I
include firm level controls, particularly Tobin's Q and cash flow, to control for changing investment opportunities over time. Second, in some specifications, I redefine the dependent variable to be the industry adjusted investment rate, defined as the firm's invesment rate in year t minus the average investment rate in the firm's own 3-digit SIC industry in the same year. Overall, the results lend support to the hypothesis that debt repurchases reduce investment distortions and improve investment efficiency. The results in Table VIII also provide interesting evidence that parts of the ARRA Act had the effect of improving investment decisions for a subsample of firms in the US economy.
V. Conclusion
Despite the voluminous literature on capital structure choice, very little is known about corporate debt repurchase activity. This paper provides an investment based explanation for why firms would choose to exchange cash on hand for a reduction in outstanding debt. The basic idea is that when a firm has risky debt outstanding, proceeds from new investment will accrue disproportionately to bondholders, providing managers an incentive to reject otherwise value-enhancing investment opportunities. In addition to the incentive effects, firms with a debt overhang will find it difficult to raise external financing.
Faced with this situation, the option to repurchase debt becomes valuable to both shareholders and bondholders. Using cash to repurchase debt increases expected payoffs to shareholders by an amount larger than the foregone cash and will induce investment, thus partially mitigating the debt overhang problem. Thus, debt repurchases are a market-based substitution for renegotiation for corporate bonds.
Using a sample of debt repurchases, I find evidence consistent with the investment based explanation for debt repurchases. Firms tend to repurchase debt when expected transfers to bondholders are high, even after controlling for leverage. The announcement of debt repurchases appears to be interpreted as good news to shareholders, as announcement returns are significantly positive. I find evidence that both the quantity and quality of investment (efficiency) improve following a debt repurchase. This result is stronger among firms with higher potential investment frictions as measured by relatively higher overhang, more leverage, and lower bond ratings. This finding is robust to alternative measures of investment opportunities and controls for endogeneity and selection bias.
This paper makes three main contributions to the literature. First, it is one of the first papers to systematically study the market for repurchasing debt. Second, it adds to the literature focusing on the agency costs of debt and the interaction of financing choices with investment, providing evidence that debt can negatively affect investment and demonstrating how firms adjust their capital structures in response to these frictions. Finally, this paper complements research by Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2007) , providing situations in which cash is not always the same thing as negative debt.
While the real investment rationale for buying repurchases is supported by the data, admittedly it isn't the only reason why firms may choose to repurchase debt. For example, a firm may choose to engage in a tender offer along with a consent solicitation in order to remove restrictive covenants from the bond indenture. Another potential motive is that managers may view their bonds as being underpriced and view a repurchase as a good investment. These and other potential explanations are left as future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The shareholders will pursue a debt repurchase if the face value of debt declines enough so that the net present value of investment from the shareholders perspective is positive.
The condition V D < 1 is not sufficient to guarantee that the reduction in debt will be large enough to induce investment. The maximum price per dollar of face value that shareholders are willing to pay is the price V D such that
Rearranging and solving for V D gives
Thus, for any V D < V D , the expected payoff to shareholders becomes positive and the shareholders will repurchase debt and invest. . Note first that in the absence of a repurchase, the price of the bond will be the expected payment scaled by the face value of debt:
Proof of Proposition
The bondholders choosing to tender part of their claim will have an expected total repayment of
while those who hold out will have an expected total repayment of
Therefore, in order to prevent a hold-out problem, the shareholders must offer a price such that the expected repayment is higher for those who tender than for those who hold out. That is, V D must be such that
Rearranging equation (A.6) and solving for V D gives the minimum price that gives every bondholder the incentive to tender and thus prevent a hold-out problem:
Note that if the offer price is greater than that given in equation (A.3) but less than V D , the free-rider problem arises. Although bondholders as a group would be better off if the firm repurchased debt and invested, each individual has an incentive to hold out and not tender a portion of their debt.
shareholders will be willing to repurchase debt, bondholders will be willing to tender, and the investment project will be accepted.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Suppose the shareholders offer a proportion α of equity for a proportion δ of outstanding debt. The terms of the debt-for-equity exchange must satisfy three conditions in order for both shareholders and bondholders to be better off relative to a cash repurchase of debt. First, the exchange must induce the firm to invest. That is, δ must be large enough such that
This condition states that the reduction in debt must be large enough so that the net present value of investment is positive from the shareholders perspective. Given a δ that satisfies equation (A.8), the share of offered equity α must satisfy
This condition states that the residual payoff to the original shareholders must be larger than their payoff in the repurchase case. The third condition states that α and δ must be chosen such that the bondholders are willing to exchange debt for equity. This can be stated as: .10) says that the expected total payments to bondholders agreeing to the exchange must be higher than the expected payments to those who hold out.
Assume that these three conditions hold. Let α be the proportion of equity offered to bondholders which makes the shareholders indifferent between an exchange and a repurchase. Using equation (A.9), this proportion of equity is
This α * reflects the maximum amount of equity that shareholders are willing to exchange equity for debt rather than use the firm's cash to repurchase debt. Substituting α * into equation (A.10) and simplifying gives
which is a contradiction since V D < 1 implies that
There are no values of α and δ that can simultaneously prevent a free-rider problem among bondholders and induce the shareholders to exchange. Therefore, when the firm has enough cash to repurchase debt, the shareholders will strictly prefer a debt repurchase to a debt-for-equity exchange. Note: ***,** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. is the median investment rate for industry k in year t. Industry medians are calculated based on 3-digit SIC codes . Firm and time fixed effects are included. Firm-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is investment scaled by total assets minus the median investment rate in the firm's industry, where investment includes capital expenditures, acquisitions and R&D expenses. After is a dummy variable set equal to zero for years -2 and -1 relative to the repurchase, and set equal to one for years +1 and +2. Note: ***,** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. This table presents average treatment effects based on propensity scores and investment regressions for the sample of control firms. Panel A reports average treatment effects and difference estimates for investment levels, investment sensitivity, and equity issuance. Investment sensitivity is measured as the sensitivity of investment to proxies for growth opportunities. For example, the sensitivity of investment to industry Q is measured by taking the cross-sectional average of the statistic:
The cross-sectional average of this statistic is the same as the slope coefficient from a simple regression of investment on industry Q. Industry investment sensitivity is calculated in a similar fashion. Panel B reports the difference in regression coefficients between the treatment and control groups for the following regression: Note: ***,** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Note: ***,** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. = α i + γ t + δ · 1 (ARRA) + θ · 1 (i=T ) + η · 1 (ARRA) · 1 (i=T ) + β 1 Q i,t−1 + β 2 CF i,t−1 + ε it , where α i and γt are firm and year fixed effects, 1 ARRA is a dummy variable taking a value of one in the years following the ARRA and zero otherwise, and 1 i=T is a dummy variable set equal to one for firms that belong to the treatment group and zero for firms in the control group. The first two specifications report the results when the treatment group is defined as firms with outstanding bonds at the time of the ARRA and firms with no bonds outstanding as the control group. The final two specifications report the results when the treatment group is defined as firms with bonds outstanding with a subinvestment grade credit rating and firms with bonds and an investment grade rating as the control group. There are two different dependent variables. The first, I K is the investment rate and the second, I * K , is the industry adjusted investment rate. The coefficient of interest is η, which picks up the difference-in-differences effect. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and year and are reported in parentheses. Note: ***,** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. This figure plots the Epanechnikov kernal density of industry adjustment investment rates for both the discounted bond sample ("treatment") and the non-discounted bond sample ("control") for the period before and after the deferral of CODI tax. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distributions is rejected at the 1% level for both samples.
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Figure 3. Kernel Density Estimation: Investment Rates
This figure plots the Epanechnikov kernal density of industry adjustment investment rates for both the discounted bond sample ("treatment") and the non-discounted bond sample ("control") for the period before and after the deferral of CODI tax. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distributions is rejected at the 1% level for both samples. After Policy
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